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Abstract 
This paper reviews prior studies that provide an understanding of earnings quality concepts. It presents various definitions of 
earnings quality and discusses proxies used in empirical literature to measure earnings quality. Prior studies measure earnings 
quality by using time-series properties of earnings including earnings persistence, predictability, timeliness and volatility; relating 
accruals to future cash flows, associating earnings with stock market metrics such as stock prices and returns and assessing the 
level of discretionary accruals. The literature emphasizes that the quality of earnings is very important as the earnings figure is 
widely used in many contractual agreements and investing decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
The extant literature has not yet come to a unanimous conclusion on what earnings quality is; rather it is viewed 
as a conceptual term that can be defined from many different perspectives. Academic researchers have introduced 
and operationalized different dimensions of earnings quality construct using certain characteristics of earnings and 
its components. This conceptual paper describes the definitions from financial statements users’ perspective and 
economic-based perspective, discusses various measures used in prior studies as proxies for earnings quality, 
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explains the functions and limitations associated with each approach and provides examples of the application of 
each approach in existing studies on earnings quality. 
2. Earnings Quality from Different Perspectives 
The quality of earnings is usually defined in accounting studies from two different perspectives, the decision-
usefulness perspectives and the economic-based perspectives. From a decision-usefulness perspective, earnings 
quality is regarded as being high if the earnings numbers are useful for decision making purposes. Based on this 
point of view, the notion of earnings quality is defined differently by different users of financial statements. For 
example, according to Dechow and Schrand (2004), analysts are likely to view earnings to be of high quality when 
the earnings numbers accurately reflect the company’s current operating performance, are good indicators of future 
operating performance and are a good summary measure for assessing firm value. This is consistent with the 
objectives of financial analysts, which are to evaluate the performance of the company, assess the extent to which 
current earnings indicates future performance and determine whether the current stock price reflects intrinsic firm 
value (Dechow and Schrand, 2004).  Investors are likely to have similar objectives. On the other hand, creditors and 
compensation committees may define high quality earnings as earnings that are easily convertible into cash flows 
and that reflect managers’ real performance. 
Financial statement users may also define earnings quality in terms of the ‘absence of earnings management’. 
This is because the intentional manipulation of earnings by managers, within the limits possible in accounting 
standards, may distort the usefulness of earnings to users.  Earnings that are persistent and predictable may not be of 
high quality if it is a result of earnings management. Managers may tend to manage earnings for a number of reasons 
including those related to capital market motivations, compensation and bonus as well as debt or lending contracts, 
which will result in low quality of earnings. According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), debt agreements based on 
low and defective earnings will induce unintended wealth transfers; overstated earnings used as an indicator of 
managers’ performance in compensation contracts will result in overcompensation to managers; and low quality of 
earnings will provide defective resource allocation signals to investors. 
Dechow and Schrand (2004) state that when earnings conform to the spirit and the rules of generally accepted 
accounting principles, they are of high quality in the eyes of regulators. Earnings should be free from fraud and show 
a true and fair view of a company’s financial performance. However, accounting standard setters are also concerned 
with the effectiveness of the standards that they have promulgated. By focusing on the usefulness of earnings 
numbers to financial statements users, standard setters can evaluate quality of earnings prepared under a particular 
set of accounting standards. 
Other than the decision-usefulness context, earnings quality has also been explained in prior research using the 
economics-based definition of Hicksian income (e.g. Dempster, 2008; Hodge, 2003; Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
Shipper and Vincent (2003, p. 98)  define earnings quality as “the extent to which reported earnings faithfully 
represent Hicksian income, where representational faithfulness means correspondence or agreement between a 
measure or description and the phenomenon that it purports to represent”. This construct measures the quality of 
earnings based on its correlation with ‘true earnings’, which does not depend on accounting recognition rules and the 
implementation of the accounting rules. ‘True earnings’ is a neutral and context-free benchmark, yet difficult to 
assess as Hicksian income is not observable. However, since Hicksian earnings are not observable, the construct is 
not operational (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
Similar to the Hicksian income definition, Yee (2006) explains that earnings quality depends on two main 
elements, the ‘fundamental’ earnings and reported earnings. The former is a profitability figure that measures a 
firm’s ability to make future dividend payments, while the latter is an imperfect signal or estimation of 
‘fundamental’ earnings that a firm announces. According to Yee (2006), earnings quality is based on the ability of 
reported earnings to quickly and precisely reveal a firm’s fundamental earnings. The more accurate and timely that 
reported earnings reflect shocks in the present value of expected future dividends, the higher the quality of earnings. 
228   Khairul Anuar Kamarudin and Wan Adibah Wan Ismail /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  226 – 236 
3. Earnings Quality Measures 
Previous studies define earnings quality through certain characteristics of earnings such as persistence or 
sustainability, predictive ability, smoothness, conservatism, value-relevance, timeliness, earnings management or 
earnings manipulation and accrual quality. In general, earnings which are viewed as being of high quality are those 
that have a high level of persistence, are more predictable, less volatile, more timely, have lower level of earnings 
management and/or higher accrual quality. The following subsections discuss each of the measures, which have 
frequently been used in prior studies. 
3.1. Earnings Management 
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1985) define earnings management as the process of taking deliberate steps, within 
the constraints of generally accepted accounting practice, to bring about a desired level of reported earnings. 
Similarly, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) note that: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some shareholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depends on reported accounting numbers. 
 
According to the definitions, it is clear that earnings management is possible because of the discretion available to 
managers in preparing financial reports. However, it is limited to the boundaries set under a particular set of 
accounting standards. Thus, any changes in the amount or extent of managerial discretion allowed under the 
accounting standards may also change the degree of earnings management.  
The extant literature on earnings management suggests that earnings management exists due to the important 
roles and functions played by the reported income or earnings number. As claimed by Vander Bauwhede (2001), 
managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of the firm’s explicit and implicit contracts, the 
firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or 
several other specific circumstances. For example, earnings numbers are normally included in management 
compensation and bonus contracts, debts covenants, management buyouts, proxy contests, valuation of initial public 
offerings (IPOs), labour union negotiations and lobbying on accounting standards and regulations. 
There are numerous situations or incentives that may motivate management to become involved in earnings 
management. Researchers provide evidence that managers have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to 
maximise their bonus and compensations (e.g. Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995; Healy, 
1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; McNichols, Wilson, and DeAngelo, 1988; Shuto, 2007; Steven, 1998; 
Teshima and Shuto, 2008), to avoid violation of debt covenants or to decrease the cost of debt (e.g. Carlson and 
Bathala, 1997; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994), to circumvent industry and 
other regulations (e.g. Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca, 2005; Jones, 1991; 
Key, 1997; Moyer, 1990; Reza, 2003), to meet the earnings forecasts and targets issued by financial analysts or 
management (e.g. Dutta and Gigler, 2002; Jaggi, Chin, Lin, and Lee, 2006; Kasznik, 1999; Robb, 1998) and to 
maximise the proceeds of IPOs (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Chaney and Lewis, 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, 
and Sefcik, 2001; Friedlan, 1994; Jaggi et al., 2006; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). 
Previous researchers have established that earnings management can be achieved through several means. The 
findings of their studies show that using the discretion allowed under accounting standards, managers manipulate 
earnings by changing firm’s depreciation policy including depreciation methods and estimates (Archibald, 1969; 
Herrmann and Inoue, 1996; Keating and Zimmerman, 2000), adjusting the estimate of the provision for bad debts 
(McNichols et al., 1988), changing the useful life and/ or residual value of fixed  assets through assets revaluations 
(Easton, Eddey, and Harris, 1993; Ervin, Keith, and Tracy, 1998; Whittred and Chan, 1992), classifying gains and 
losses as extraordinary items (Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan, 1976; Beattie, Brown, Ewers, and John, 1994; Choo and 
Peter, 1998; Godfrey and Jones, 1999; Jaggi and Baydoun, 2001), not recognising goodwill impairment or not 
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recognising goodwill amortisation and/or write-offs (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Henning, Shaw, and Stock, 2004; 
Jordan, Clark, and Vann, 2007; Sevin and Schroeder, 2005). 
Zheng (2003) claims that the purpose of earnings management, as stated in Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition, 
indicates that managed earnings are of lower quality than unmanaged earnings. Consistently, previous studies on 
earnings quality (e.g. Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008; Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley, 2007; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005) use the term ‘earning quality’ to denote the absence of earnings management. In addition, Levitt 
(1998) mentioned that when earnings management is on the rise, the quality of financial reporting is on the decline.  
Prior studies have adopted a variety of approaches to measuring the degree of earnings management. Healy 
(1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991) are among the early studies that use abnormal accrual models to detect 
earnings management. Dechow et al. (1995) explain the development of these early models and give detailed 
descriptions and provide comparisons between the models. Dechow et al. (1995) found that among Healy (1985), 
DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), modified Jones model and industry model, the modified version of Jones (1991) 
model is the most powerful method of detecting earnings management.  
Many of the existing studies refer to Jones (1991) model as a basis for assessment of the level of earnings 
management. In the Jones (1991) model, the concept of discretionary accruals is used to indicate the quality of 
earnings. The main idea in the Jones (1991) model is that accruals are likely to be the result of managerial discretion 
and changes in the firm’s economic environment (Hermanns, 2006). Basically, the model estimates firms’ abnormal 
accruals (discretionary) based on certain economic and accounting fundamentals using time-series regression. In the 
model, Jones relates total accruals to the change in sales and the level of gross property, plant and equipment. The 
residuals of the model are considered as abnormal or discretionary accruals as they are not explained by the firm’s 
economic conditions. The regression model is as follows: 
 
TAit / Ait-1 = αi(1 / Ait-1) + β1i(ΔREVit / Ait-1) + β2i (PPEit / Ait-1) + εit (1) 
 
where: 
TAit : total accruals in year t for firm i; 
ΔREVit : revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit : gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 : total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
εit : error term in year t for firm i. 
 
According to Jones (1991), revenue is included in the model because it is an objective measure of the firm’s 
operations before managers’ manipulations. It is expected that total accruals, which includes changes in accounts 
receivables, inventories and accounts receivables rely on the extent of changes in revenue (Jones, 1991). While 
revenues are included to control for firms economic environment, the gross, property and equipment is included to 
control for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. The prediction error in the 
model, εit, measures the level of discretionary accruals. 
3.2. Accrual Quality 
A seminal study by Dechow and Dichev (2002) introduced a model for earnings quality based on the notion that 
the function of accruals is to adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, so that it better reflects firm 
performance. This model relates total current accruals (TCA), measured by changes in working capital, to lagged, 
current and future cash flows from operations, and has been used in the existing studies as a proxy for earnings 
quality (Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004; Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent, 2003; Myers, Myers, and Omer, 2003; Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck, and Willekens, 2007). In the model, 
the total current accrual is measured by changes in working capital, since related cash-flow realisations generally 
occur within one year, which is as follows: 
 
TCAi,t / Ai,t-1 = α0,i + α1,i(CFOi,t-1 / Ai,t) + α2,i (CFOi,t / Ai,t)  + α3,i (CFOi,t+1 / Ai,t)  (2) 
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where: 
TCAi,t : firms i’s total current accruals in year t; 
Ai,t : firms i’s average total assets at the beginning and at the end of fiscal year t; 
CFOi,t : cash flows from operations in year t, calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items minus total accruals. 
     
 
This model captures both intentional and unintentional accrual estimation error by management, which is the 
inverse measures of earnings quality (Hermanns, 2006). In other words, the estimation error indirectly measures the 
extent to which accruals map into cash realization, where a poor match indicates low quality.  
Since the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach provides a direct link between income and accruals, this model 
does not have the same problems as the earnings management approach introduced by Jones (1991), which requires 
the assumption that certain underlying accounting fundamentals remain constant and unmanipulated. However, 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is also subject to some limitations. Schipper and Vincent (2003) highlight that the 
model does not distinguish non-manipulative estimation errors from intentional earnings management and requires 
the assumption that working capital accruals lag or lead cash receipts by no more than one year. 
McNichols (2002) suggests future research should include the change in revenues and property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) as additional explanatory variables in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, in order to distinguish 
the unintentional accrual estimation error from those that are intentional. However, inclusion of the new explanatory 
variables would require the same assumptions as in the Jones (1991) model.  
Based on the McNichols (2002) discussion of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, Francis et al. (2005) 
examine the market pricing of accruals quality by investors. Their results show that the market requires less return 
from firms with better accruals quality than from firms with poor accruals quality.  
Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007) examine the relationship between accrual quality and internal controls and find that 
firms with weak internal control over financial reporting generally have lower accruals quality. This supports their 
theory that a good internal control system is a key foundation for high quality financial reporting. A later study by 
Krishnan, Srinidhi and Su (2008) suggests that inventory policy affects earnings variability and accruals quality. 
They find that accruals quality is systematically worse for FIFO firms than for LIFO firms after controlling for 
correlated omitted variables and known firm attributes.  
3.3. Earnings Persistence 
Earnings quality is also defined in previous studies and accounting text books in terms of persistence and 
sustainability (e.g. Ahmed, Billings, and Morton, 2004; Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok, 2006; Penman and Zhang, 2002; Richardson, 2003; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005; 
Sloan, 1996). Revsine, Collins and Johnson (2002) state that earnings are considered to be of high quality when they 
are sustainable; and Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) defined quality of earnings as the extent to which we might 
expect the reported level of earnings to be sustained. Focusing on investors’ perception of earnings quality, Ayres 
(1994) notes that one view of earnings quality relates to the overall permanence of earnings. That is, high quality of 
earnings reflect earnings that can be sustained for a long- period. Similarly, in an empirical study that investigates 
the joint effects of accounting conservatism and investment on the quality of earnings, Penman and Zhang (2002) 
define high-quality earnings to be ‘sustainable earnings’ as often referred to in financial analysis. They explain that 
when an accounting treatment produces unsustainable earnings, it indicates that the earnings figures are of poor 
quality. 
Earnings persistence is often measured in previous research (Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Francis et al., 2004; Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993) using the time-series approach, estimated as the slope coefficient estimate, β1 from the following 
autoregressive model of order one (ARI) for annual split-adjusted earnings per share:  
 
Xi,t / Ai,t-1 = Β0,i + β1,iXi,t-1+ εi,t (3) 
 
231 Khairul Anuar Kamarudin and Wan Adibah Wan Ismail /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  226 – 236 
where: 
Xi,t : firm i’s earnings per share during year t; 
Xi,t-1 : firm i’s earnings per share during year t-1; 
εi,t : error term. 
 
An estimate of β1 closer to 1 implies highly persistent earnings, while a value of β1 close to 0 implies highly 
transitory earnings.  
Another stream of studies on earnings persistence introduced by Sloan (1996), decomposes earnings into two 
underlying components; accruals and cash flows. He analyses the characteristics of information (about future 
earnings) contained in those two components of current earnings and investigates the extent to which this 
information is reflected in stock prices. Sloan (1996) argues that the accrual and cash components of earnings are 
both relevant to financial statement users, but the former is less reliable, and therefore that the accrual component of 
earnings is less persistent than the cash flow component. This signifies that there is a negative association between 
the magnitude of the accrual component of earnings and the persistence of current earnings, and thus earnings 
quality. 
The different persistence of the accrual and cash components of earnings observed in Sloan (1996) inspired 
subsequent studies to further investigate the implication of accruals for earnings quality (Zheng, 2003). For example, 
Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) modified the Sloan (1996) model and introduced a cross-sectional model to 
examine the impact of audit tenure on the persistence of the accrual component of earnings.  
3.4. Earnings Predictability 
A number of studies measure earnings quality by assessing the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows 
(Barragato and Markelevich, 2008; Cohen, 2004; Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003; Francis et al., 2004; 
Greenberg, Johnson, and Ramesh, 1986; Van der Meulen et al., 2007). Barragato and Markelevich (2008) define 
high-quality earnings as an earnings stream that is a better predictor of future operating cash flows. They claim that 
their definition of earnings quality frequently appears in financial analysts’ reports and treatises of financial 
statement analysis, which supports the view that financial statements should provide information that is useful in 
assessing the amounts, timing and uncertainties of prospective cash inflows.  
Earlier, there were arguments that current earnings may not be a good predictor of future cash flows compared to 
current cash flows because of the managerial discretion involved in measuring earnings. To clarify this matter, 
Greenberg et al. (1986) empirically examine whether current earnings or current cash flows are the better predictor 
of future cash flows. This is done by comparing the coefficient of determination (R2) from regressions using either 
cash flows or earnings as the variable. Their results show higher R2 from the earnings regression, which suggest that 
current earnings are the better predictor of future cash flows. Similarly, Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) report 
that the forecasting model using current earnings yields smaller variations for forecast errors than the model based 
on cash flows. On the other hand, Barth, Cram and Nelson (1999) find that disaggregating earnings into cash flows 
and aggregate accruals significantly increases the adjusted R2 for forecasting future cash flows.  
Earnings predictability is a similar construct to earnings persistence as both relate to the time-series behavior of 
earnings. However, Schipper and Vincent (2003) note that there is a possible situation where persistence and 
predictability may not be consistent. Volatile earnings might be high quality in terms of high persistence (i.e. 
earnings follow random walk), but low in quality in terms of low predictability (i.e the magnitude of a typical shock 
to earnings is large). 
3.5. Value Relevance 
In much of the accounting research into financial reporting quality, earnings quality is measured by its value-
relevance to investors in relation to equity valuation (e.g. Cheng, Hsieh, and Yip, 2007; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 
2006; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). These studies relate earnings directly to 
stock prices or market returns. The association (the slope coefficient or the explanatory power of the model) between 
earnings and stock market performance suggests that earnings are both relevant and reliable to investors (Barth, 
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Beaver, and Landsman, 2001). Generally, earnings is considered to be higher in quality if it is more value- relevant. 
As claimed by Bao and Bao (2004): 
Theoretically, if quality of earnings is improved, then the association between firm value and 
reported earnings should also be improved. If quality of earnings is impaired, then the association 
between firm value and reported earnings should also be impaired. 
 
Among others, studies investigating the effect of changes in accounting standards have found that earnings 
quality is significantly affected by the change indicated in value relevance models. For example, Cheng et al. (2007) 
examine whether the choice of accounting treatment of the transition obligation under SFAS106 affects firm value, 
and whether the quality of earnings is improved after the implementation of the standard. They found that although 
the total value relevance of both earnings and book value is not affected by the choices allowed under the new 
accounting standard, earnings quality under the immediate recognition method has been severely undermined by the 
one-time charge of the transition obligation. The study concludes that, by transforming the accounting standard from 
the cash basis to accrual basis, SFAS 106 is proved to have resulted in higher quality of earnings. 
Another set of studies compares the value relevance of earnings under different accounting standards. For 
example, Harris, Lang and Moller (1994) compare the associations of earnings reported under foreign and US 
GAAP. Another study by Joos and Lang (1994) investigates the financial statement effects of differences in 
accounting measurement practices in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and find evidence of significant 
differences in financial ratios and stock market valuation based on accounting data. Hung (2001) investigates the 
effect of accrual accounting in different accounting standards on the value relevance of financial statements across 
21 countries. Using a sample of 17,743 firm-year observations during the period 1991-1997, the findings show that 
the use of accrual accounting negatively affects the value relevance of accounting performance measures (earnings 
and ROE) for countries with weak shareholder protection. Moreover, for countries with strong shareholder 
protection, accrual accounting does not negatively affect the value relevance of earnings. 
3.6. Timeliness 
Timeliness of earnings is often regarded as one of the characteristics of high quality financial reporting. 
According to Abdullah (2006), timelier reporting is associated with higher accounting quality as users are able to use 
the information for such purpose as valuation and evaluation. More timely information (including earnings) is more 
relevant and thus more useful for financial statements users. Based on this idea, a number of studies use timeliness as 
one of the qualities of desirable earnings. In Francis et al. (2004), which examines the association between cost of 
equity and earnings quality, the quality of earnings is represented by seven different attributes including timeliness.  
A number of studies have examined factors associated with the timeliness of earnings. Bushman, Chen, Engel and 
Smith (2004) examine the relationship between governance mechanisms and three different proxies for earnings 
timeliness. They find evidence of a positive association between timeliness and the proportion of outside board 
members. Abdullah (2006) studies the roles of the composition of board of directors, audit committee and the 
separation of the roles of the board chairman and the chief executive officer on the timeliness of reporting in 
Malaysia. Abdullah (2006) found that board independence and the separation of the roles of board chairman and 
CEO are significantly associated with timelier reporting. The study also shows that the 1997 financial crisis had 
adversely affected the timeliness of reporting, implying that during difficult periods, companies tend to take a longer 
time to prepare their audited financial reports. 
In Beekes, Pope and Young (2004), timeliness is defined as the length of time taken to reflect information in 
earnings. Similarly, Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos (2004, p. 120) state that: 
Reported earnings may be considered to be timely when they fully reflect the information that has 
been incorporated by the market in its pricing of a firm’s equity. Earnings are less timely if value 
changes that are recognised by the market in the present period are not incorporated in the 
accounting computations until sometime in the future. 
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4. Conclusions 
Using different approaches to defining earnings quality, the extant literature emphasizes that the quality of 
earnings is very important to users of financial information as well as to practitioners, regulators and accounting 
researchers. This is because reported earnings are considered to be the premier information in financial statements. 
According to Salvato and Moores (2010), high quality accounting information on attributes such as earnings is 
essential for firms to access equity and debt markets. The informative function of earnings means that it is often 
used as a basis to describe the financial performance of a firm. For example, the earnings numbers and various ratios 
or metrics derived from it are widely used in compensation agreements and debt agreements (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003). Earnings are also used by analysts to evaluate firms’ previous and current performance and forecast firms’ 
future ability to create additional wealth to shareholders.  
According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), the importance of earning quality can be explained from at least two 
perspectives, the contracting perspective and investment perspective. From the contracting perspective, low quality 
of earnings may result in unintentional wealth transfers. For instance, firms that reward managers based on earnings 
may overcompensate the managers if earnings are overstated. From an investing perspective, poor quality of 
earnings is problematic as it can mislead investors, resulting in misallocation of resources (Myers et al., 2003; 
Schipper and Vincent, 2003). High earnings quality would also increase the attractiveness of stocks to outside 
investors and increase market liquidity (Young and Guenther, 2003),  lower cost of debt (Salvato and Moores, 
2010), reduce cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Salvato and Moores, 2010), and promote more efficient 
capital allocation (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2011). Thus, it is very important 
for the reported earnings to be high in quality.  
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